Philosophical Studies 67 (3):197-217 (1992)
Coherence theorists have universally defined justification as a relation only among (the contents of) belief states, in contradistinction to other theories, such as some versions of foundationalism, which define justification as a relation on belief states and appearance states.
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Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
Explanationist Rebuttals (Coherentism Defended Again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.
Basic Reasons and First Philosophy: A Coherentist View of Reasons.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):75-93.
A Reply to Cling's “The Epistemic Regress Problem”.William Roche - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (2):263-276.
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