Social Epistemology 22 (3):247 – 256 (2008)

Authors
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
This paper argues for a solution to a problem that contrastivism faces. The problem is that contrastivism cannot preserve closure, in spite of claims to the contrary by its defenders. The problem is explained and a response developed
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DOI 10.1080/02691720802546146
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References found in this work BETA

Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions.Keith DeRose - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):913-929.
Epistemic Operators.Fred I. Dretske - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (24):1007-1023.
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.

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Citations of this work BETA

Solving the Problem of Nearly Convergent Knowledge.Chris Tweedt - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (4):219-227.
Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained.Michael Hughes - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (3):577-590.

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Contrastivism in Epistemology.Martijn Blaauw - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):227 – 234.
From Contextualism to Contrastivism.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):73-104.
Undermining the Case for Contrastivism.Ram Neta - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):289 – 304.

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