Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):409 – 421 (2001)
In his ‘Causation as Influence’,1 David Lewis proposed a counterfactual theory of cause which was designed to improve on his previous account.2 Here I offer counter-examples to this new account, involving early preemption and late preemption, and a revised account, which is no longer an influence theory, that handles those counter-examples.
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Causation in Biology: Stability, Specificity, and the Choice of Levels of Explanation.James Woodward - 2010 - Biology and Philosophy 25 (3):287-318.
Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens.Sungho Choi - 2005 - Erkenntnis 63 (1):101-118.
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