Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (3):703-710 (1999)
Finkish dispositions, those dispositions that are lost when their conditions of realization occur, pose deep problems for counterfactual accounts of dispositions. David Lewis has argued that the counterfactual approach can be rescued, offering such an account that purports to handle finkish as well as other dispositions. The paper argues that Lewis’s account fails to account for several kinds of dispositions, one of which involves failure to distinguish parallel processes from unitary processes.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
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