Faith and Philosophy 19 (3):348-357 (2002)
In clarifying and defending Molinism, Thomas Flint argues against a position he terms Maverick Molinism. This version of Molinism maintains that, though counterfactuals of freedom have their truth-value logically prior to God’s acts of will, God could have so acted that these counterfactuals would have had a different truth value from that which they actually have. Flint believes this position is flawed, and presents an argument for rejecting it. I argue that Flint’s argument against Maverick Molinism is flawed, and suggest that the Maverick has a position with advantages over more traditional versions of Molinism.
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