Philosophical Studies 59 (3):235-261 (1990)

Authors
Jonathan L. Kvanvig
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
Epistemologists often offer theories of justification without paying much attention to the variety and diversity of locutions in which the notion of justification appears. For example, consider the following claims which contain some notion of justification: B is a justified belief, S's belief that p is justified, p is justified for S, S is justified in believing that p, S justifiably believes that p, S's believing p is justified, there is justification for S to believe that p, there is justification for S's believing p, and S has a justification for believing that p. In addition to these passive uses of the notion of justification, there are active uses as well: S justified his belief in p, believing e justifies believing p, etc. The syntactic variety involves semantic difference as well. For example, the proposition S has a justification for believing that p does not entail that S believes p, whereas the proposition S justifiably believes that p does entail that S believes p. Our ultimate goal is to show that this diversity is only superficial by arguing that there is a basic kind of justification. On the way, however, we shall argue that there are three central uses of a notion of justifica- tion in the above list: propositional justification (as in p is justified for S), personal justification (as in S is justified in believing that p) and doxastic justification (as in S's believing p is justified). Our preliminary argument will be that the multiplicity above can be explained in terms of these three locutions, and the substance of our argument will be to show that one of these three is the basic kind of justification. Success in this task will thereby justify, at least in part, the practice of contem- porary epistemologists. Our conclusions, however, shall not be of much comfort to contemporary epistemology, for the way in which the apparent diversity in the uses of the notion of justification is eliminated undermines much of recent epistemology.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00355744
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,308
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.
The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
On Justifications and Excuses.B. Madison - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Propositional Justification, Evidence, and the Cost of Error.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):197–216.
A Paradox of Justified Believing.Colin Cheyne - 2009 - Ratio 22 (3):278-290.
On the Relationship Between Propositional and Doxastic Justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.
Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
Is Justification Knowledge?B. J. C. Madison - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Research 35:173-191.
Fumerton’s Principle of Inferential Justification.Michael Huemer - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:329--340.
Structural Justification.Robert Audi - 1991 - Journal of Philosophical Research 16:473-492.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
232 ( #33,272 of 2,326,001 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #64,082 of 2,326,001 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes