Wiley: Ratio 34 (1):44-55 (2021)

Authors
Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University
Abstract
Does shame have a place in a mature moral agent's psychology? Does it play a useful and positive role in morality? One skepticism that disputes shame's compatibility with mature moral agency or its being a useful moral emotion is that shame appears heteronomous in nature: We experience shame not because we have behaved badly by our own moral standards, but because we have been reproved by other people and suffered an injury to our social image. To mitigate this skepticism, this paper will propose a way in which we can reconcile shame with moral autonomy. Specifically, I will argue that a mature moral agent is vulnerable to shame because she cares a great deal about morality, and possesses certain character traits that dispose her to take others’ moral criticisms seriously. Occurrences of shame therefore are not always a threat to a moral agent's autonomous moral judgment.
Keywords intellectual humility  moral autonomy  moral virtue  open‐mindedness  shame
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/rati.12283
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

References found in this work BETA

Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations.Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr & Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):509-539.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Shame and Necessity.Bernard Williams - 1992 - University of California Press.

View all 16 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Shame, Guilt and Morality.Fabrice Teroni & Otto Bruun - 2011 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):223-245.
The Moral Virtue of Open-Mindedness.Yujia Song - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):65-84.
An Apology for Moral Shame.Cheshire Calhoun - 2004 - Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (2):127–146.
Are Moral and Intellectual Virtues Distinct?Heather Battaly - 2018 - Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 68:23-27.
Open-Mindedness as a Moral Virtue.Nomy Arpaly - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (1):75.
Equanimity and the Moral Virtue of Open-Mindedness.Emily McRae - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (1):97-108.
Chinese People's Shame and the Improvement of Civic Morality.Meng Kao - 2009 - Philosophy and Culture 36 (5):167-179.
Education for Autonomy and Open-Mindedness in Diverse Societies.Rebecca M. Taylor - 2017 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 49 (14):1326-1337.
A Conditional Defense of Shame and Shame Punishment.Erick Jose Ramirez - 2017 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 4 (1):77-95.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-07-29

Total views
42 ( #249,616 of 2,439,690 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
23 ( #32,171 of 2,439,690 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes