Why Concepts Should Not Be Pluralized or Eliminated

Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):7-23 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Concept Pluralism and Concept Eliminativism are two positions recently proposed in the philosophy and the psychology of concepts. Both of these theories are motivated by the view that all current theories of concepts are empirically and methodologically inadequate and hold in common the assumption that for any category that can be represented in thought, a person can possess multiple, distinct concepts of it. In this paper, I will challenge these in light of a third theory, Conceptual Atomism, which addresses and dispels the contentious issues. In particular, I contend that Conceptual Atomism, when properly understood, is empirically adequate and can overcome difficulties that plague Pluralism and Eliminativism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The plurality of concepts.Daniel Aaron Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Atomism, pluralism, and conceptual content.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):131-163.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2003 - In Ted Warfield (ed.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 190-213.
Conceptual atomism rethought.Susan Schneider - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3):224-225.
Are concepts a natural kind? On concept eliminativism.Guido Löhr - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4.
Is conceptual atomism a plausible theory of concepts?Jack M. C. Kwong - 2007 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):413-434.
Natural Kinds and Concept Eliminativism.Samuli Pöyhönen - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), EPSA11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Cham: Springer. pp. 167--179.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-04

Downloads
528 (#53,177)

6 months
126 (#42,333)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jack M. C. Kwong
Appalachian State University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
On Clear and Confused Ideas.R. Millikan - 2001 - Cambridge Studies in Philosophy.

View all 19 references / Add more references