Don't take unnecessary chances!

Synthese 132 (1-2):9-26 (2002)
Abstract
The dominant argument for the introduction of propensities or chances as an interpretation of probability depends on the difficulty of accounting for single case probabilities. We argue that in almost all cases, the``single case'' application of probability can be accounted for otherwise. ``Propensities'' are needed only intheoretical contexts, and even there applications of probability need only depend on propensities indirectly.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1019610615497
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