Giving up Certainties

Abstract
One of the serious motivations for the development of non-monotonic logics is the fact that, however sure we may be of some set of facts, there can come a time at which at least some of them must be given up. A number of philosophical approaches have stemmed from the study of scientific inference, in which a law or theory, accepted on good evidence at one time, comes to be rejected on the basis of more evidence. These approaches are reviewed, and an alternative approach, whose key idea is the control of observational error for the purpose of predictive adequacy is developed.
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