Phenomenal Concepts and Physical Facts: A Dialogue with Mary

Filozofia 74 (10):797-807 (2019)
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This is a dialogue between an opponent of the phenomenal concept strategy and Mary from Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument. In this dialogue, Mary, who has complete physical knowledge about what it is like to see red, but has never seen red, is a physicalist and she defends the phenomenal concept strategy against her interlocutor’s objections. In the end, none of them is able to convince the other, but their conversation, through considerations of different versions of the knowledge argument and different applications of the phenomenal concept strategy, reveals the most basic disagreement, or clash of intuitions, they have. The implied conclusion of the dialogue is that the disagreement on the success of phenomenal concept strategy as a physicalist response to the knowledge argument cannot be resolved unless this particular clash of intuitions is resolved.



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Tufan Kıymaz
Bilkent University

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References found in this work

Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2010 - Routledge.
What Mary Didn't Know.Frank Jackson - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (5):291-295.

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