Critical Discussion of David Velleman, Foundations for Moral Relativism, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013. Pp. x +109. Price: £12.95 [Book Review]

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):209-214 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Foundations for Moral Relativism consists of five self-standing, though loosely related, essays on the nature of agency and its metaethical foundations. The essays do not aspire to offer any grand theory of agency or metaethics, but only to lay out some of the foundations for such theories. These foundations portray how agency in general is constructed in the social context of a community, how moral agency in particular is constructed in the social context of a community, and how a derivative relativist account of morality can be not only intellectually respectable but also plausible. In paving the way for moral relativism, Velleman clarifies popular confusions about relativism, responds to a number of traditional objections and sketches a sophisticated version of moral relativism that is meant to improve on more simplistic versions.There is much to praise in these thought provoking essays and they are highly recommended to anyone working on agency and metaethics. They are lucid, succi ..

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,119

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-08-05

Downloads
57 (#298,699)

6 months
11 (#532,306)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Christos Kyriacou
University of Cyprus

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.
The normative web: an argument for moral realism.Terence Cuneo - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Truth.Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons (eds.) - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 8 references / Add more references