Is Logic Distinctively Normative?

Erkenntnis 86 (4):1025-1043 (2019)
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Abstract

Logic is widely held to be a normative discipline. Various claims have been offered in support of this view, but they all revolve around the idea that logic is concerned with how one ought to reason. I argue that most of these claims—while perhaps correct—only entail that logic is normative in a way that many, if not all, intellectual disciplines are normative. I also identify some claims whose correctness would make logic normative in a way that sets it apart from other disciplines. I argue that we have no reason think that these claims are correct. In other words, logic is not a distinctively normative discipline.

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Ivar Labukt
University of Tromsø

Citations of this work

The Normative Autonomy of Logic.Diego Tajer - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2661-2684.
Disjoint Logics.Federico Pailos - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
Rastrgan između obrisa logike.Abbas Ahsan & Marzuqa Karima - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (2):10-41.

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References found in this work

Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Moral realism: a defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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