Natural and artificial cognition: On the proper place of reason

South African Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):137-149 (2005)
We explore the psychological foundations of Logic and Artificial Intelligence, touching on representation, categorisation, heuristics, consciousness, and emotion. Specifically, we challenge Dennett's view of the brain as a syntactic engine that is limited to processing symbols according to their structural properties. We show that cognitive psychology and neurobiology support a dual-process model in which one form of cognition is essentially semantical and differs in important ways from the operation of a syntactic engine. The dual-process model illuminates two important events in Logic and Artificial Intelligence, namely the emergence of non-monotonicity and of embodiment, events that changed the traditional paradigms of ‘Logic = the study of deductive inference' and ‘Symbolic AI'. S. Afr. J. Philos. Vol.24(2) 2005: 137-151
Keywords Cognition  Metaphysics  Reason  Syntactic  Dennett, Daniel
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DOI 10.4314/sajpem.v24i2.31421
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Emma Ruttkamp & Johannes Heidema (2005). Reviewing Reduction in a Preferential Model-Theoretic Context. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):123 – 146.

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