Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge

In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276 (2011)
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Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University
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Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.
Assertion and Expertise.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):509-517.

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