On the Interplay of the Cognitive and the Social in Scientific Practices

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):977-988 (2005)
I consider the questions, central to recent disagreements between Longino and Kitcher: Is it constitutive of making judgments of the cognitive acceptability of theories that they be made under certain social relations (that embody specific social values) that have been cultivated among investigators (Longino)? Or is making them (sound ones) just a consequence of social interactions that occur under these relations (Kitcher)? While generally endorsing the latter view, I make a distinction, not made by Longino, between sound acceptance and endorsement of a theory, and argue that her view applies to endorsement.
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DOI 10.1086/508954
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A New Direction for Science and Values.Dan Hicks - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3271-95.
Values in Science: The Case of Scientific Collaboration.Kristina Rolin - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (2):157-177.
Rehabilitating Neutrality.Hugh Lacey - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (1):77-83.
‘Holding’ and ‘Endorsing’ Claims in the Course of Scientific Activities.Hugh Lacey - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:89-95.
Values, Standpoints, and Scientific/Intellectual Movements.Kristina Rolin - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 56:11-19.

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