Teleological behaviorism and the intentional scheme

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1):134-135 (1995)
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Abstract

Teleological behaviorism, unlike Skinnerian behaviorism, recognizes that are needed to account adequately for human behavior, but it rejects the essential role in behavioral explanations of the subjective perspective of the agent. I argue that teleological behaviorism fails because of this rejection

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Hugh Lacey
Swarthmore College