Philosophical Quarterly 49 (197):471-490 (1999)

Authors
Jennifer Lackey
Northwestern University
Abstract
We often talk about knowledge being transmitted via testimony. This suggests a picture of testimony with striking similarities to memory. For instance, it is often assumed that neither is a generative source of knowledge: while the former transmits knowledge from one speaker to another, the latter preserves beliefs from one time to another. These considerations give rise to a stronger and a weaker thesis regarding the transmission of testimonial knowledge. The stronger thesis is that each speaker in a chain of testimonial transmission must know that p in order to pass this knowledge to a hearer. The weaker thesis is that at least the first speaker must know that p in order for any hearer in the chain to come to know that p via testimony. I argue that both theses are false, and hence testimony, unlike memory, can be a generative source of knowledge
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00154
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Norms of Assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.
Counter-Closure.Federico Luzzi - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):673-683.
Second-Hand Knowledge.Elizabeth Fricker - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):592–618.
The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.

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