Why we don't deserve credit for everything we know

Synthese 158 (3):345--361 (2007)
Abstract
A view of knowledge—what I call the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge(DCVK)—found in much of the recent epistemological literature, particularly among so-called virtue epistemologists, centres around the thesis that knowledge is something for which a subject deserves credit. Indeed, this is said to be the central difference between those true beliefs that qualify as knowledge and those that are true merely by luck—the former, unlike the latter, are achievements of the subject and are thereby creditable to her. Moreover, it is often further noted that deserving credit is what explains the additional value that knowledge has over merely lucky true belief. In this paper, I argue that the general conception of knowledge found in the DCVK is fundamentally incorrect. In particular, I show that deserving credit cannot be what distinguishes knowledge from merely lucky true belief since knowledge is not something for which a subject always deserves credit.
Keywords Knowledge  Luck  Credit
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-006-9044-x
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford University Press.
Warrant and Proper Function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
Belief's Own Ethics.J. Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.

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Citations of this work BETA
Skill in Epistemology I: Skill and Knowledge.Carlotta Pavese - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (11):642-649.
Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.
The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge.John Greco - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):57–69.

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