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The essay presents Saul Kripke's argument for mind/body-dualism and makes the suppositions explicit on which it rests. My claim, inspired by Richard Boyd, is that even if one of Kripke’s central suppositions - the principle of necessity of identities using rigid designators - is shared by the non-traditional identity theorist, it is still possible for her to rebut Kripke’s dualism.
Keywords philosophy of mind  mind/body-dualism  materialism  principle of necessity of identities  rigid designator  Saul Kripke  Richard Boyd
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