The principle of the identity of indiscernibles and quantum mechanics

Philosophy of Science 77 (1):117-136 (2010)
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Abstract

It is argued that recent discussion of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles (PII) and quantum mechanics has lost sight of the broader philosophical motivation and significance of PII and that the `received view' of the status of PII in the light of quantum mechanics survives recent criticisms of it by Muller, Saunders, and Seevinck.

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Author Profiles

Tomasz Bigaj
University of Warsaw
James Ladyman
University of Bristol

Citations of this work

Ontic structural realism as a metaphysics of objects.Michael Esfeld & Vincent Lam - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich, Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 143-159.
In defence of ontic structural realism.Steven French & James Ladyman - 2011 - In Alisa Bokulich & Peter Bokulich, Scientific Structuralism. Springer Science+Business Media. pp. 25-42.

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References found in this work

I—James Ladyman: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure.James Ladyman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23-43.

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