Theoria 10 (2):109-124 (1995)

Authors
Cristina Lafont
Northwestern University
Abstract
This article argues for an intermediate standpoint concerning the theory of truth which finds an equilibrium between realist an epistemic conceptions of truth. At the same time it is accepted that truth is a notion with an ultimate realist sense, but it is made clear that this intuitive sense does only have a non-trivial (i.e. non-“disquotational”), reading if the function of “truth” is seen from within the epistemic framework of our practices of belief-formation (i.e. of confirmation and revision). Following the realist line one can reconstruct the unconditional validity attributed to the intuitive concept of truth out of its internal relation with the concept of “reality”; this in turn makes clear that the epistemic strategy of extracting this uncoditionality from an emphatic concept of perfect, infallible knowledge is more than weak. This is because only preserving the decisive function of truth as a corrective, as a fallibilist reserve (incompatible therefore with any concept of “infallible” knowledge) one can see how truth relates to cognitive learning processes. On the other hand, the strategy of this paper shows thus how this is possible avoiding the bad alternative of metaphysical realism and relativism
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Philosophy of Science
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0495-4548
DOI theoria199510230
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 65,599
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Putnam, Realism and Truth.Janet Folina - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Frege's Puzzle About the Cognitive Function of Truth.Dirk Greimann - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):425-442.
Internal Realism.Brian Ellis - 1988 - Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
Measuring the Success of Science.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1990 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:435 - 445.
A Proposal for a Non-Realist Theory of Truth.María Ponte Azcárate - 2007 - The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:105-109.
Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.
Referencia Y Verdad.Cristina Lafont - 1994 - Theoria 9 (2):39-60.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
60 ( #182,156 of 2,462,141 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,335 of 2,462,141 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes