Social Epistemology 21 (3):281 – 297 (2007)
At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Gilbert's influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage.
|Keywords||belief, collective knowledge, epistemology, gilbert margaret, group, individualism, social epistemology, virtue|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich - 2001 - Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences.Alvin Goldman - 1992 - Cambridge: Mass.: Mit Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Just the Right Thickness: A Defense of Second-Wave Virtue Epistemology.Guy Axtell & J. Adam Carter - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):413-434.
Four Varieties of Character-Based Virtue Epistemology.Jason Baehr - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (4):469-502.
Group Virtues: No Great Leap Forward with Collectivism.Sean Cordell - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):43-59.
Numerous Ways to Be an Open-Minded Organization: A Reply to Lahroodi.Todd Jones - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (4):439 – 448.
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