What neuropsychology tells us about consciousness

Philosophy of Science 60 (1):67-85 (1993)

I argue that, contrary to some critics, the notion of conscious experience is a good candidate for denoting a distinct and scientifically interesting phenomenon in the brain. I base this claim mainly on an analysis of neuropsychological data concerning deficits resulting from various types of brain damage as well as some additional supporting empirical evidence. These data strongly point to the hypothesis that conscious experience expresses information that is available for global, integrated, and flexible behavior
Keywords Behavior  Brain  Consciousness  Neurophysiology  Science
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DOI 10.1086/289718
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On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Consciousness, Dreams and Virtual Realities.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (1):35-58.
The Elusive Quale.Howard Rachlin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):692-693.
The Contents of Consciousness: A Neuropsychological Conjecture.Jeffrey A. Gray - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):659-76.

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