Frontiers of Philosophy in China 14 (3):469-489 (2019)

Authors
Changsheng (Lex) Lai
University of Edinburgh
Abstract
An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost.
Keywords sensitivity-based scepticism  the sensitivity principle  the closure principle  sceptical hypothesis
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,987
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

View all 43 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.
A Davidsonian Response to Radical Scepticism.Ju Wang - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (1):95-111.
Closure and Underdetermination Again.Ju Wang - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):1129-1140.
The Structure of Sceptical Arguments.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.
Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge.Christoph9 Kelp - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-292.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2019-10-25

Total views
17 ( #554,245 of 2,324,057 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #113,104 of 2,324,057 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes