Memory scepticism and the Pritchardean solution

Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-20 (2023)
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A large portion of our knowledge seems to rest on our memories, while memory scepticism poses challenges to our memory knowledge. This paper will delve into different forms of memory scepticism. The goal of this paper is twofold: First, drawing on Moon (2017) and Frise (2022), I compare and criticize various forms of sceptical arguments provided by them. Meanwhile, the two most threatening arguments are picked out: the Russellian argument and the argument from doubtful reliability. Second, I demonstrate that the two arguments are essentially based on the closure principle and the underdetermination principle, respectively, and hence, Pritchard’s biscopic anti-sceptical proposal is applicable. A Pritchardean solution to the problem of memory scepticism will then be sketched out.



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Changsheng Lai
Shanghai JiaoTong University

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References found in this work

On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
Warrant and proper function.Alvin Plantinga - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.

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