Res Publica 26 (2):275-280 (2020)
AbstractLachlan Umbers defends democracy against Jason’s Brennan’s competence objection, by showing that voting even incompetently does not violate the rights of others, as the risk imposed is negligible, and furthermore lower than other permissible actions, e.g. driving. I show there are costs in taking this line of argument. Accepting it would make arguing for the duty to vote more difficult in two ways: since voting incompetently is permissible, and not voting imposes less risk than not voting, then not voting is permissible; in terms of fairness, voting incompetently is worse than not voting, if voting incompetently is permissible, then there cannot be a fairness-based duty to vote.
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The right to a competent electorate.Jason Brennan - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (245):700-724.
Democratic Legitimacy and the Competence Objection.Lachlan Umbers - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (2):283-293.