The Prospects of a Theory of Criminal Culpability: Mens Rea and Methodological Doubt

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 14 (1):57-80 (1994)
Jacqueline A. Laing
Oxford University (DPhil)
This article discusses the role of the mental in the analysis of criminal liablity. The relation between the general conditions for mens rea and those of criminal liability are considered. Claims made by John Gardner and Heike Jung are considered. Their suggestion that there is a hard and fast distinction between the principles of moral and criminal culapability are considered and shown to have some absurd conclusions.
Keywords Criminal Liability  Mental States  Intention  Action  Intentional Action
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DOI 10.1093/ojls/14.1.57
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