Theoria 85 (1):8-17 (2019)

Authors
Kaave Lajevardi
University of Toronto, St. George Campus (PhD)
Saeed Salehi
University of Tabriz
Abstract
We take an argument of Gödel's from his ground‐breaking 1931 paper, generalize it, and examine its validity. The argument in question is this: "the sentence G says about itself that it is not provable, and G is indeed not provable; therefore, G is true".
Keywords Gödel's first incompleteness theorem  arithmetic  self‐reference  soundness  the Gödel sentence  truth  ω‐consistency
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DOI 10.1111/theo.12169
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References found in this work BETA

Self-Reference in Arithmetic I.Volker Halbach & Albert Visser - 2014 - Review of Symbolic Logic 7 (4):671-691.
On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
On “Seeing” the Truth of the Gödel Sentence.George Boolos - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):655-656.
On Gödel Sentences and What They Say.Peter Milne - 2007 - Philosophia Mathematica 15 (2):193-226.

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Citations of this work BETA

There May Be Many Arithmetical Gödel Sentences.Kaave Lajevardi & Saeed Salehi - forthcoming - Philosophia Mathematica:nkaa041.

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