A Simple Realist Account of the Normativity of Concepts

Disputatio 1 (19):1-17 (2005)
Abstract
I argue that a concept is applied correctly when it is applied to the kind
of things it is the concept of. Correctness as successful kind-tracking is
fulfilling an externally and naturalistically individuated standard. And the normative aspect of concept-application so characterized depends on the relational (non-individualistic) feature of conceptual content. I defend this view against two objections. The first is that norms should provide justifications for action, and the second involves a version of the thesis of indeterminacy of reference.
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