Being pessimistic about the objective present

Synthese (12):1-16 (2020)
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Some philosophers argue that non-presentist A-theories problematically imply that we cannot know that this moment is present. The problem is usually presented as arising from the combination of the A-theoretic ideology of a privileged presentness and a non-presentist ontology. The goal of this essay is to show that the epistemic problem can be rephrased as a pessimistic induction. By doing so, I will show that the epistemic problem, in fact, stems from the A-theoretic ideology alone. Hence, once it is properly presented, the epistemic problem presents a serious threat to all A-theories.



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Derek Lam
California State University, Sacramento

Citations of this work

The Wave Theory of Time: A Comparison to Competing Tensed Theories.Nikk Effingham - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):172-192.

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References found in this work

An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What is structural realism?James Ladyman - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (3):409-424.

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