Primitive Self-consciousness and Avian Cognition

The Monist 95 (3):486-510 (2012)

Authors
Andy Lamey
University of California, San Diego
Abstract
Recent work in moral theory has seen the refinement of theories of moral standing, which increasingly recognize a position of intermediate standing between fully self-conscious entities and those which are merely conscious. Among the most sophisticated concepts now used to denote such intermediate standing is that of primitive self-consciousness, which has been used to more precisely elucidate the moral standing of human newborns. New research into the structure of the avian brain offers a revised view of the cognitive abilities of birds. When this research is approached with a species-specific focus, it appears likely that one familiar species, the chicken (Gallus gallus domesticus), also exhibits primitive self-consciousness. Given the likelihood that they are primitively self-consciousness, chickens warrant a degree of moral standing that falls short of that enjoyed by persons, but which exceeds the minimal standing of merely conscious entities.
Keywords Animal cognition  Moral standing  Primitive self-consciousness  Neuroethics
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Reprint years 2014
ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist201295325
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