The Dynamic Foundations of Epistemic Rationality

Philosophy (forthcoming)

Barry Lam
Vassar College
Classical theories of epistemic rationality take an agent\\textquoteright{}s individual beliefs to be the only things that are rational or irrational. For them, rationality is wholly static. Recent work in epistemology take sets of individual beliefs and also changes of belief over time to be rational or irrational. For these theories, rationality is both static and dynamic. However, for both groups, static rationality is fundamental. In my dissertation, I argue to the contrary that, in fact, all rationality is dynamic rationality. Epistemic reasons, rationality, and justi{}cation as applying only to changes of belief. This wholly dynamic view of rationality, which I call \\textquotedblleft{}Dynamicism\\textquotedblright has wide-ranging epistemological consequences. A small set of simple, elegant, and independently motivated principles of dynamic rationality can illuminate and solve otherwise interminable epistemological disputes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 49,066
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.
Mental Processes and Synchronicity.Brian Hedden - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):873-888.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
173 ( #48,637 of 2,311,196 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #126,482 of 2,311,196 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature