The Dynamic Foundations of Epistemic Rationality

Philosophy (forthcoming)
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Abstract

Classical theories of epistemic rationality take an agent\\textquoteright{}s individual beliefs to be the only things that are rational or irrational. For them, rationality is wholly static. Recent work in epistemology take sets of individual beliefs and also changes of belief over time to be rational or irrational. For these theories, rationality is both static and dynamic. However, for both groups, static rationality is fundamental. In my dissertation, I argue to the contrary that, in fact, all rationality is dynamic rationality. Epistemic reasons, rationality, and justi{}cation as applying only to changes of belief. This wholly dynamic view of rationality, which I call \\textquotedblleft{}Dynamicism\\textquotedblright has wide-ranging epistemological consequences. A small set of simple, elegant, and independently motivated principles of dynamic rationality can illuminate and solve otherwise interminable epistemological disputes

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2009-01-28

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Barry Lam
Vassar College

Citations of this work

A Reply to the Synchronist.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):859-871.
Mental Processes and Synchronicity.Brian Hedden - 2016 - Mind 125 (499):873-888.

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