The normativity of naturalistic epistemology

Philosophia 26 (3-4):337-358 (1998)
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Abstract

Naturalistic epistemology is accused of ruling out the normative element of epistemology. Different naturalistic responses are considered. It is argued that the content of attributions of knowledge is best understood in purely descriptive terms. So their normative force is merely hypothetical. Attributions of justified belief, on the other hand, do have intrinsic normativity. This derives from their role in our first-person deliberation of what to believe. It is suggested that the content of them is best captured in naturalistic terms by accepting a dispositional analysis of justification that is a species of the generic dispositional conception of value.

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Markus Lammenranta
University of Helsinki

Citations of this work

Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.

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References found in this work

Ontological relativity and other essays.Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.) - 1969 - New York: Columbia University Press.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

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