Work and object

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (2):141–162 (2002)
The paper considers what kinds of things are musical, literary, pictorial and sculptural works, how they relate to physical objects or abstract types, and what their identity and survival conditions are. Works are shown to be cultural objects with essential intentional and relational properties. These essential properties are connected to conditions of production and conditions of reception, of both a generic and work-specific kind. It is argued that work-identity is value-laden, whereby essential to the survival of a work is the quality of the experience the work affords. However, the overall stance is realist, defending the view that works are real, perceivable, and objectively characterisable
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Christy Mag Uidhir (2011). Minimal Authorship (of Sorts). Philosophical Studies 154 (3):373 - 387.
M. W. Rowe (2012). The Problem of Perfect Fakes. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 71:151-175.

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