In Steven Cowan (ed.), Problems in Epistemology and Metaphysics : An Introduction to Contemporary Debates. London: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 38-51 (2020)

Authors
Markus Lammenranta
University of Helsinki
Abstract
The paper defends Cartesian skepticism by an argument relying on internalism and infallibilism. It argues that this sort of skepticism gives the best explanation of our intuitions and ordinary epistemic practices.
Keywords knowledge  skepticism  fallibilism  infallibilism  pragmatics
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