Philosophical Studies 176 (3):693-707 (2019)

Authors
Fabio Lampert
University of California, Irvine
Abstract
Several theists, including Linda Zagzebski, have claimed that theism is somehow committed to nonvacuism about counterpossibles. Even though Zagzebski herself has rejected vacuism, she has offered an argument in favour of it, which Edward Wierenga has defended as providing strong support for vacuism that is independent of the orthodox semantics for counterfactuals, mainly developed by David Lewis and Robert Stalnaker. In this paper I show that argument to be sound only relative to the orthodox semantics, which entails vacuism, and give an example of a semantics for counterfactuals countenancing impossible worlds for which it fails.
Keywords Counterfactuals  Counterpossibles  Possible worlds semantics  Impossible worlds  David Lewis  Theism  Conditionals
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1035-5
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References found in this work BETA

Essence and Modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
On the Plurality of Worlds.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (1):42-47.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.

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