A Defense of Restricted Phenomenal Conservatism

Philosophical Papers 42 (3):315 - 340 (2013)
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Abstract

In this paper, I criticize Michael Huemer's phenomenal conservatism, the theory of justification according to which if it seems to S that p, then in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. Specifically, I argue that beliefs and hunches provide counterexamples to phenomenal conservatism. I then defend a version of restricted phenomenal conservatism, the view that some but not all appearances confer prima facie justification on their propositional contents. Specifically, I defend the view that S has defeasible justification for believing that p if and only if it seems to S that p and it seems to S that she is acquainted with the fact that makes p true. Finally, I criticize Huemer's self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservatism

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2013-10-24

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Harold Langsam
University of Virginia

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References found in this work

The Problems of Philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1912 - Portland, OR: Home University Library.
The skeptic and the dogmatist.James Pryor - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):517–549.
Ethical Intuitionism.Michael Huemer - 2005 - New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.

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