A Puzzle about Hume’s Theory of General Representation

Journal of the History of Philosophy 54 (2):257-282 (2016)
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Abstract

according to hume’s theory of general representation, we represent generalities by associating certain ideas with certain words. On one prominent understanding of this theory, calling things by one name or another does not represent any real qualities of those things or any real relations between them. This interpretation runs into difficulty when we turn our attention to Hume’s own use of such general terms throughout the Treatise. It would seem that Hume’s own distinctions—such as the impression-idea distinction and simple-complex distinction—require that the items so..

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2016-04-30

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David Landy
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

Recent Scholarship on Hume's Theory of Mental Representation.David Landy - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):333-347.
Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - 2021 - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10:195-229.

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