Disability or Extraordinary Talent—Francesco Lentini (Three Legs) Versus Oscar Pistorius (No Legs)

Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 2 (2):97-111 (2008)

Abstract

It seems fairly straightforward to describe what should and should not count as a disability into two separate and opposing categories. In this paper we will challenge this assumption and critically reflect on the narrow relations between the concepts of 'talent' and 'disability'. We further relate such matters of terminology and classification to issues of justice in what is conceived of as disability sport. Do current systems of classification do justice to the performances of disabled athletes? Is the organisation of a just and fair competition similar for abled as it is for disabled sport? Two cases (of Francesco Lentini and Oscar Pistorius) will be explored to further illustrate the complexities of these questions, in particular when related to notions of normality and extraordinary performances

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