Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (2):203-213 (2020)

Gerald Lang
University of Leeds
In his Rights Forfeiture and Punishment, Christopher Heath Wellman argues that his preferred ‘strong’ version of rights forfeiture theory makes the moral rights of due process and a fair trial null and void for guilty offenders. They may still possess legal rights to due process, but these are not strong pre-institutional moral rights. I explain here why I disagree with Wellman. I also suggest that he is not entitled, by his own lights, to affirm strong forfeiture theory, at least in our social world.
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DOI 10.1007/s11572-019-09497-6
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References found in this work BETA

Trials and Punishments.John Cottingham & R. A. Duff - 1987 - Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149):448.
Trials and Punishments.R. A. Duff - 1986 - Cambridge University Press.
Why Not Forfeiture?Gerald Lang - 2014 - In Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (ed.), How We Fight: Ethics in War. Oxford University Press. pp. 38-61.
What Follows From Defensive Non-Liaibility?Gerald Lang - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):231-252.
Rights Forfeiture and Punishment.Christopher Wellman - 2017 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

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