Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401 (2008)

Authors
Peter Langland-Hassan
University of Cincinnati
Abstract
Abstract:  How it is that one's own thoughts can seem to be someone else's? After noting some common missteps of other approaches to this puzzle, I develop a novel cognitive solution, drawing on and critiquing theories that understand inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia as stemming from mismatches between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Considerable attention is paid to forging links between the first-person phenomenology of thought insertion and the posits (e.g. efference copy, corollary discharge) of current cognitive theories. I show how deficits in the subconscious mechanisms regulating inner speech may lead to a 'fractured phenomenology' responsible for schizophrenic patients' reports of inserted thoughts and auditory verbal hallucinations. Supporting work on virtual environments is discussed, and lessons concerning the fixity of delusional belief are drawn.
Keywords inner speech  thought insertion
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00348.x
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
Philosophical investigations.Ludwig Wittgenstein & G. E. M. Anscombe - 1953 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 161:124-124.
The Language of Thought.J. A. Fodor - 1978 - Critica 10 (28):140-143.
Thought and Language.A. L. Wilkes, L. S. Vygotsky, E. Hanfmann & G. Vakar - 1964 - Philosophical Quarterly 14 (55):178.

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Citations of this work BETA

Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
Knowing That I Am Thinking.Alex Byrne - 2008 - In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
Thought Insertion: Abnormal Sense of Thought Agency or Thought Endorsement?Paulo Sousa & Lauren Swiney - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):637-654.

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