Imaginative Attitudes


Authors
Peter Langland-Hassan
University of Cincinnati
Abstract
The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining aids human action and inference and the conditions under which it is veridical. The proposed solution is, first, to posit a variety of imaginative attitudes—akin to the traditional propositional attitudes—which have different associated correctness (or satisfaction) conditions. The second part of the solution is to allow for imaginings with “hybrid” contents, in the sense that both mental images and representations with language-like constituent structure contribute to the content of imaginings
Keywords imagination  sensory imagination  perceptual imagination  mental imagery  perky  langland-hassan
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12115
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References found in this work BETA

The Language of Thought.Jerry A. Fodor - 1975 - Harvard University Press.
The Transparency of Experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Roots of Remembering: Radically Enactive Recollecting.Daniel D. Hutto & Anco Peeters - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. New York: Routledge. pp. 97-118.
Overly Enactive Imagination? Radically Re-Imagining Imagining.Daniel D. Hutto - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (S1):68-89.
Tolerant Enactivist Cognitive Science.Thomas Raleigh - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):226-244.
Active Desire.Uku Tooming - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):945-968.

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