Introspective misidentification

Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1737-1758 (2015)
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Abstract

It is widely held that introspection-based self-ascriptions of mental states are immune to error through misidentification , relative to the first person pronoun. Many have taken such errors to be logically impossible, arguing that the immunity holds as an “absolute” necessity. Here I discuss an actual case of craniopagus twins—twins conjoined at the head and brain—as a means to arguing that such errors are logically possible and, for all we know, nomologically possible. An important feature of the example is that it is one where a person may be said to be introspectively aware of a mental state that occurs outside of her own mind. Implications are discussed for views of the relation between introspection and mental state ownership, and between introspection and epistemic criteria for the “mark of the mental.”

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Peter Langland-Hassan
University of Cincinnati

Citations of this work

A Case of Shared Consciousness.Tom Cochrane - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1019-1037.
Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
The Minimal Self Hypothesis.Timothy Joseph Lane - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103029.
No Such Thing as Too Many Minds.Luke Roelofs - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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