Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):56–71 (2008)
The ‘Responsibility Objection’ to Judith Thomson's famous argument for the permissibility of abortion challenges the relevance of her ‘Violinist Analogy’ to certain types of voluntary unwanted pregnancy, on the grounds that those pregnancies, even though they may be unwanted, are pregnancies for which the woman can be plausibly held responsible. This article considers the force of a number of recent objections to the Responsibility Objection, advanced by Harry Silverstein, David Boonin, and Jeff McMahan, and judges them to be unpersuasive. It is concluded that, in the absence of further considerations, the Responsibility Objection carries force.
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How to Understand a Woman's Obligations to the Fetus in Unwanted Pregnancies.Kristen Hine - 2013 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 10 (2):239-247.
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