Okasha on inductive scepticism

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):226-232 (2002)
Authors
Marc Lange
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Abstract
In a recent paper replying to the inductive sceptic, Samir Okasha says that the Humean argument for inductive scepticism depends on mistakenly construing inductive reasoning as based on a principle of the uniformity of nature. I dispute Okasha's argument that we are entitled to the background beliefs on which (he says) inductive reasoning depends. Furthermore, I argue that the sorts of theoretically impoverished contexts to which a uniformity-of-nature principle has traditionally been restricted are exactly the contexts relevant to the inductive sceptic's argument, and (pace Okasha) are not at all remote from actual scientific practice. I discuss several scientific examples involving such contexts
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00264
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References found in this work BETA

What Did Hume Really Show About Induction?Samir Okasha - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (204):307-327.
The White Shoe is a Red Herring.I. J. Good - 1966 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 17 (4):322.
The Paradoxes of Confirmation - a Survey.R. G. Swinburne - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (4):318 - 330.

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Citations of this work BETA

What If the Principle of Induction Is Normative? Formal Learning Theory and Hume's Problem.Daniel Steel & S. Kedzie Hall - 2010 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (2):171-185.
Probabilistic Induction and Hume's Problem: Reply to Lange.Samir Okasha - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):419–424.

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