Partiality, Asymmetries, and Morality's Harmonious Propensity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):1-42 (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We argue for asymmetries between positive and negative partiality. Specifically, we defend four claims: i) there are forms of negative partiality that do not have positive counterparts; ii) the directionality of personal relationships has distinct effects on positive and negative partiality; iii) the extent of the interactions within a relationship affects positive and negative partiality differently; and iv) positive and negative partiality have different scope restrictions. We argue that these asymmetries point to a more fundamental moral principle, which we call Morality’s Harmonious Propensity. According to this principle, morality has a propensity toward preserving positive relationships and dissolving negative ones.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

The Enmity Relationship as Justified Negative Partiality.Benjamin Lange & Joshua Brandt - forthcoming - In Monika Betzler & Jörg Löschke (eds.), The Ethics of Relationships: Broadening the Scope. Oxford University Press.
Other-Sacrificing Options: Reply to Lange.Romy Eskens - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).
The Ethics of Partiality.Benjamin Lange - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 1 (8):1-15.
Negative Partiality.Josh Brandt - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (1):33-55.
Other‐Sacrificing Options.Benjamin Lange - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):612-629.
Partiality and Meaning.Benjamin Lange - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-28.
The practice of partiality.Marilyn Friedman - 1991 - Ethics 101 (4):818-835.
Associative Duties and Immigration.Javier Hidalgo - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (6):697-722.
Justifying Partiality.Errol Lord - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):569-590.
Scope Restrictions, National Partiality, and War.Jeremy Davis - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (2).

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-07-26

Downloads
514 (#47,694)

6 months
144 (#30,248)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Joshua Brandt
University of Toronto at Scarborough

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The possibility of altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford,: Clarendon P..
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - Philosophy 52 (199):102-105.
Why We Should Reject S.Derek Parfit - 1984 - In Reasons and Persons. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.David Hume - 1751 - New York,: Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp.

View all 35 references / Add more references