In J. Corns (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Pain. Routledge (forthcoming)

Authors
Peter Langland-Hassan
University of Cincinnati
Abstract
This chapter (from Routledge's forthcoming handbook on the philosophy of pain) considers the question of whether people are always correct when they judge themselves to be in pain, or not in pain. While I don't show sympathy for traditional routes to the conclusion that people are "incorrigible" in their pain judgments, I explore--and perhaps even advocate--a different route to such incorrigibility. On this low road to incorrigibility, a sensory state's being judged unpleasant is what makes it a pain (or not).
Keywords pain  introspection  incorrigibility  consciousness
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Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

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