David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (3):680 - 703 (1997)
Charles Peirce claimed that "anything is general in so far as the principle of excluded middle does not apply to it and is vague in so far as the principle of contradiction does not apply to it." This seems to imply that general propositions are neither true nor false and that vague propositions are both true and false. But this is not the case. I argue that Peirce's claim was intended to underscore relatively simple facts about quantification and negation, and that it implies neither that general propositions are neither true nor false nor that vague propositions are both true and false.
|Keywords||Peirce excluded middle contradiction vagueness|
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