Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):18 (2012)

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Abstract
In this paper, I first develop desiderata for an ontology of intuitions on the basis of paradigmatic cases of intuitions in philosophy. A special focus lies on cases that have been subject to extensive first-order philosophical debates but have been receiving little attention in the current debate over the ontology of intuitions. I show that none of the popular accounts in the current debate can meet all desiderata. I discuss a view according to which intuitions reduce to beliefs, Timothy Williamson's account of intuitions as beliefs or inclinations to believe, and traditional rationalist accounts of intuitions. I then show that a widely ignored account of intuitions as appearance states can meet the desiderata best
Keywords Applied Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy
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DOI 10.5840/eip201213118
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Experimental Philosophy and the Theory of Reference.Max Deutsch - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (4):445-466.
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Believing Conjunctions.Simon J. Evnine - 1999 - Synthese 118 (2):201-227.
The Reality of Responses to Fiction.R. T. Allen - 1986 - British Journal of Aesthetics 26 (1):64-68.

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